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Abstract: The road to the automation of the agricultural 
processes passes through the safe operation of the 
autonomous vehicles. This requirement is a fact in ground 
mobile units, but it still has not well defined for the aerial 
robots (UAVs) mainly because the normative and 
legislation are quite diffuse or even inexistent. Therefore, to 
define a common and global policy is the challenge to 
tackle. This characterization has to be addressed from the 
field experience. Accordingly, this paper presents the work 
done in this direction, based on the analysis of the most 
common sources of hazards when using UAV's for 
agricultural tasks. The work, based on the ISO 31000 
normative, has been carried out by applying a three-step 
structure that integrates the identification, assessment and 
reduction procedures. The present paper exposes how this 
method has been applied to analyze previous accidents and 
malfunctions during UAV operations in order to obtain real 
failure causes. It has allowed highlighting common risks 
and hazardous sources and proposing specific guards and 
safety measures for the agricultural context.  
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1. Introduction 
The use of new technologies and techniques in the agricultural 
environment has arisen in the last decades. This remarkable 
increment, named Precision Agriculture (PA), has allowed reducing 
the use of pesticides, maximizing the irrigation efficiency or having 
an actual knowledge of the crop status. A significant part of these 
advances lies in the aerial imagery. This possibility is provided by 
several means, from satellites to airplanes, each one with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, for some years ago, 
both the agricultural and robotics societies have assisted to the mini 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (mUAVs) development. Due to their 
large availability, reduced price and great flexibility, they are 
considered to be the best alternative for this kind of applications.  
However, in spite of all their large set of advantages, they present 
also inconveniences. The main one is derived from the relative youth 
of these devices, which makes to have not a solid legal framework 
neither a great robustness. It inevitably implies risks during 
operation, with a great potential damage capacity due to their air-
vehicle condition. In this work, these risks have been analyzed, 
presenting an overview of the main hazards for UAV operations in 
agricultural tasks.  
2. Risk analysis 
2.1 Legal framework 
The applicant legislation is based on a generalist assessment of 
potential hazards, so –apart from being compulsory- supposes a first 
step in the risk analysis. Nevertheless, since the Unmanned Aircraft 
Vehicles are relatively new, this normative and legislation are still 
under current development (JAA/EUROCONTROL, 2004). Diverse 
organisms -both national and international; both official and non-
official- are implied in this development. The US’ FAA and the 
European EASA, together with EUROCAE, JARUS and some other 
organizations, reached a consensus in 2005 [6] to define formal 
policy for UAV certiﬁcation and a clear regulation for the National 
Air Space (NAS) management. Nevertheless, this agreement only 
considers large and heavy drone, leaving the Light UAVs (UAVs 
under 150 Kg) regulation to the corresponding national Air 
Authorities. 
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Apparently, the most advanced frameworks for regulating the 
UAVs operation are present in UK, Australia, Austria and France (P. 
van Blyenburgh, 2008). Nevertheless, they have used different 
classifications for organizing the drone’s regulation, making harder 
the standardization process. The common points in the on-going 
proposals have considered mUAV to those aerial vehicles lighter 
than 7/15Kg, 150m maximum height and flying under Visual Line of 
Sight (VLOS). On that basis, they have limited the maximum energy 
on impact, the maximum flight speed, distance to populated areas 
and altitude, as well as the airworthiness requirements. 
2.2 UAV specific methodology 
After a careful study of both the specific and general regulations, it 
has been considered that current normative is not clear enough (K. 
Hayhurst et al, 2006). In spite of many groups and organisms are 
working on it, a common regulation does not seem to be available in 
a short/medium period, even less if expecting concrete 
recommendation for agricultural environments (R. Clothier et al, 
2007; P. Hokstad et al, 2006). 
In this sense, in (Sanz et al., 2012) is described a three-step 
architecture specific for this kind of missions. It is based on ISO 
31000 normative and aims to enhance the evaluation overcoming the 
context-limitations and deﬁciencies observed. The first step 
corresponds to the Risk Identification (RI), including not only the 
limitations imposed (physical, temporal, behavioral and 
environmental restrictions), but also the potential hazardous 
situations and breakdown sources. In this regard, both external and 
internal sources have been considered, distinguishing the hazards 
according to their nature.  
The following step is where all these identified risks are evaluated 
according to the application: Firstly, this risk assessment method 
enhances the factors considered in ISO 31000 (Seriousness of the 
damage and probability of occurrence). It is complemented by using 
parameters like the affiliation of the agents involved in the event, or 
by extending the severity-of-the-injures rate. Secondly, as far as this 
step allows weighting the importance of some parameters, it is 
possible to adjust the assessment for an agricultural environment. It 
allows the final step (Risk Reduction, RR) to decide where to 
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intensify the effort: design process, prevention/protection methods or 
safety procedures. 
3. Agricultural environment: a case of use 
This architecture is not only valid for analysing the potential 
hazards, but also for evaluating an accident. Figure 1 presents the 
partial layout of an imagery mission that resulted in disaster, where it 
is possible to distinguish a sudden fall. 
  
a) Top view of the path b) Isometric view of the path 
Fig. 1. Real mission layout 
Following the three-step methodology for analysing the risk, the first 
step was to analyse identify the potential hazards. On the one hand, 
those ones derived from the system restrictions: In relation with the 
physical limits, it was checked that the payload (camera, 126gr) was 
balanced and that not overcome the maximum Take-Off Weight 
(MTOW, 550g of payload). It was also checked that the wind speed 
(11 Km/h) was suitable and the battery charge. 
Regarding to the temporal limits, it was assumed the use of the 
battery (6h) and the motors (around 10h the older one). The 
mission’s duration (14min) was under the theoretical limit (20min) 
and the link quality was good. As well, in reference to the 
environmental limits, it was considered that the closer airport or 
military facility was dozens of kilometres away, and the nearest 
populated is at 2.5 Km far from the test area. Besides, the higher 
relative altitude of the mission was 55m, below the non-segregated 
air space level, and no body, apart from the pilots, was present in the 
test area. The GPS signal was excellent, as well as the climatological 
conditions. 
Finally, in respect of the behavioural limits, the autonomous mode 
was set, supervised by an expert pilot. 
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On the other hand, also the hazards derived from breakouts were 
considered, focusing in the controllable stages (Preparation, start-up, 
maintenance and operation). Among them, Assemble, Adjustment, 
Interferences and Conservation processes where estimated as the 
most hazardous ones, so a special attention was paid on these 
processes. Nevertheless, as far as the accident happened, telemetry 
data have been used to focus on the analysis of possible breakdowns: 
Figure 2 presents the charts associated to the linear speed (V, green), 
the relative height (rH, red) and the acceleration (A, blue), all of 
them along the time and referred to the Z axis. It is possible to 
observe that during the mission, V and A are kept almost constant 
around 0, as could be expected since the rH is also stable. It could be 
also observed that from t=6’16’’ to 6’19’’there is a small descent, 
non-compensated by the quadrotor yet. This could be due to some 
changes in the orography, a maintained wind or a battery status 
warning. Nevertheless, the critical point is placed in t = 6’20', where 
the drone suddenly changes not only in terms of V and A, but also its 
attitude and angular rates. 
 
Fig. 2. Partial flight telemetry for breakdown analysis. 
Since these changes do not compensate the drift, few problems could 
be considered: errors in the control/navigation system, failures in the 
link stream (both GPS and communications), mechanical 
breakdowns, battery dead or unmanageable weather conditions. The 
three last options are not probable, since the telemetry was received 
without problems, highlighting a good GPS signal; the battery warns 
when it is exhausted and enters in an emergency landing procedure; 
and the weather conditions where fine. Only control and mechanical 
troubles remain, and as far as their effects are quite similar –
unbalance of the system’s equilibrium- is really hard to distinguish 
between them. Even so, given that V and A seems to be saturated 
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trying to counteract the fall vector -changing to the contrary when 
the drone turns- could be supposed that the error has a physical 
nature. The driver/shifter, the propeller or the rotor could be the 
responsible of the accident.  
Further analysis showed that, although broken due to the impact, the 
propeller was steadily fixed (and it is not probable to be broken 
during the flight). As well, the later test showed that the rotor 
worked properly. This leads to set that the driver –burned- caught 
fire during the flight. 
4. Conclusions 
As could be expected, breakdowns and failures could be present 
despite of the precautions and methodologies applied. In this 
sense, only physical guards, such as a parachute or a safety ring, 
or redundancy systems (e.g. voltage regulators and limiters), 
could increase the safety figure, by warning in advance or by 
limiting the potential damage to be caused.  
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